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I. INTRODUCTION
Part I of this article described and analyzed Portillo-Flores v. Barr, a
case in which the Fourth Circuit, over Judge Stephanie Thacker’s dissent, upheld
the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of asylum to a Salvadorian
asylum seeker who, as a child, was beaten nearly to death by MS-13 because his
sister fled the country to avoid becoming a gang leader’s girlfriend. It contends
not only that Portillo-Flores is inconsistent with general immigration standards,
but also that the Fourth Circuit committed two main legal errors. First, the Fourth
Circuit erred in requiring that Portillo-Flores should have reported the
persecution to police, even though such a report would have been ineffective or
put him in more danger. Second, the Fourth Circuit failed to apply a childspecific standard when evaluating persecution against 14-year-old PortilloFlores.
*

Anne Marie Lofaso is the Arthur B. Hodges Professor of Law, West Virginia University
College of Law. The other authors are members of the West Virginia University College of Law,
Class of 2021. The authors are members of the WVU United States Supreme Court Clinic 2020–
2021, which since the fall of 2020 has been representing Casa Fairfax, pro bono, as amicus in
Portillo-Flores v. Barr, No. 19-1591 (4th Cir.) (rehearing en banc), the subject of Part I of this
Article. A rehearing en banc for CASA de Maryland v. Trump, the subject of this Article, has been
scheduled for March 8, 2021, under Docket Number 19-2222. On Monday, February 22, the U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Department of Homeland Security v. City of New York, Order
No. 20-449, 592 U.S. ___ (2021), which presents the same issue as Casa de Maryland v. Trump.
At the time of publication, no briefing, oral argument, or opinion has been issued from the Court.
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Part II of this article addresses a different class of vulnerable persons:
the “public charge.” Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), “any
alien who . . . is likely at any time to become a public charge is inadmissible” to
the U.S.1 “Public charges” cannot receive a visa to travel to the U.S., be granted
admission to it, or receive status in it. While vulnerable groups like refugees,
asylees, and other individuals admitted to the U.S. on humanitarian grounds are
exempt from the public charge rule, 40% of all immigrants that are subject to the
rule constitute another, equally vulnerable group: spouses and minor children of
U.S. citizens seeking family-sponsored admission.2 This is the focus of Part II of
this article.
Prior to the Trump Administration’s Rule, a “public charge” was
typically defined as any person likely to be “primarily dependent” on the public,
meaning 51% of their income came from public aid.3 With the new Rule, that
definition expanded to include any person who uses any means-tested public
benefits for more than 12 months in any 36-month period.4 This test disregards
an applicant’s or immigrant’s degree of dependency in favor of an absolute
amount—what many have criticized as a thinly-veiled “wealth test.”5
Out of all immigration applications, only 1% or less have been denied
on “public charge” grounds since 1999.6 But new guidance from DHS in the last
two years caused initial denial rates to spike to 3% for the first time in a decade.7
The Final Rule not only guarantees an increased denial rate, but instills a chilling
fear of rejection in the 40% of would-be applicants who know they may need
even a small amount of public aid to afford reunification with loved ones in the
U.S.8 Perhaps worse, the new Rule further discourages admitted immigrants from
applying for necessary public aid to afford life in the U.S. for fear of being
separated from their families.9
1

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A) (West 2020).

2

See David J. Bier, An Explanation of the Public Charge Rule: Frequently Asked Questions,
CATO INST. (Aug. 12, 2019, 12:20 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/explanation-public-chargerule-frequently-asked-questions.
3
Id.
4

Id.
See BOUNDLESS, COMMENTS OF BOUNDLESS IMMIGRATION INC. ON THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY’S PROPOSED RULE, INADMISSIBILITY ON PUBLIC CHARGE GROUNDS, 83 FED.
REG.
51,114
(OCT.
10,
2018)
1
(2018),
https://boundless-wpproduction.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/2018/12/Boundless-public-charge-comment.pdf; FISCAL
POL’Y INST., “ONLY WEALTHY IMMIGRANTS NEED APPLY”: HOW A TRUMP RULE’S CHILLING
EFFECT WILL HARM THE U.S. 1 (Oct. 10, 2018) [hereinafter ONLY WEALTHY IMMIGRANTS NEED
APPLY], http://fiscalpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/US-Impact-of-Public-Charge.pdf.
5

6
7

Bier, supra note 2.
Id.

8

See ONLY WEALTHY IMMIGRANTS NEED APPLY, supra note 5.
See Bier, supra note 2; Erica Hellerstein, Immigrants Afraid of Trump’s ‘Public Charge’
Rule Are Dropping Food Stamps, MediCal, CAL. MATTERS (Sept. 22, 2019),
https://calmatters.org/california-divide/2019/09/immigrants-afraid-trump-public-charge-rule9
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These issues underlie several cases challenging the Trump
Administration’s Rule,10 and litigation has divided the federal circuit courts.11
This Part analyzes the Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in CASA de Maryland v.
Trump.12 Section I lays out the majority opinion, which upheld the Trump
Administration’s exceedingly broad definition of the statutory term “public
charge.” Section II summarizes Judge Robert B. King’s dissent, which suggests
the Majority improperly applied the Chevron deference test and ignores the
historical definition of “public charge.” Section III discusses the circuit split
arising from “public charge” litigation.
II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S PANEL OPINION IN CASA DE MARYLAND V. TRUMP
In CASA de Maryland v. Trump,13 a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit
was tasked with determining the scope of the phrase “public charge” under the
INA.14 CASA de Maryland, a Latino and immigration advocacy-and-assistance
organization, brought forth a challenge to the Trump Administration’s
(“Administration”) executive interpretation of the term “public charge.”15 The
district court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction, holding that the
Administration’s interpretation of the phrase was unreasonable and
impermissible.16
In 2018, the Trump Administration issued proposed rulemaking
regarding the definition of a “public charge” under the INA.17 As the court
explained in detail,
[t]he Rule made three relevant changes to the administration of
the inadmissibility prong of the public charge provision. First, it
replaced the 1999 Field Guidance’s definition of “public
charge,” which asked whether an alien was likely to become
“primarily dependent” on government assistance, with a
durational threshold. Specifically, under the Rule, a “public
charge” is defined as “an alien who receives one or more public
benefits . . . for more than 12 months in the aggregate within any
food-stamps-medical-benefits/; Looming Immigration Directive Could Separate Nearly 200,000
Married
Couples
Each
Year,
BOUNDLESS
(Sept.
24,
2018),
https://www.boundless.com/blog/looming-immigration-directive-separate-nearly-200000married-couples/.
10
Infra Sections II.A, B.
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Infra Section II.C.
971 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 2020).
Id. (Wilkinson, J.).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 229.
Id.; Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,114 (proposed Oct. 10,

2018).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2021

3

West Virginia Law Review Online, Vol. 123, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 2

32

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 123

36-month period.” . . . Second, the Rule jettisoned the 1999
Field Guidance’s exclusive focus on cash benefits, instead
providing that both cash and certain in-kind benefits count as
“public benefits” and can be considered in making public charge
determinations. . . . Thus, an alien’s receipt of noncash benefits
such as Section 8 housing, SNAP (i.e., food stamps), and certain
Medicaid benefits would each count towards the 12-month
threshold. . . . Third, the Rule enumerated a host of factors that
DHS officials are to consider, in addition to those set forth in the
INA, before determining whether a given alien is likely to
become a “public charge.”18
The majority defends the government’s promulgation of this rule as
considering “several empirical analyses”19 that preserve important protections
for aliens.20 Litigation ensued once the new rule was issued, and quickly, courts
became divided.21
In CASA de Maryland, the plaintiffs made three primary arguments at
the district court: (1) the DHS Rule violates both the Administrative Procedures
Act (“APA”) and the Fifth Amendment because it is “not in accordance with
law” under APA § 706 because the term “public charge” “means ‘primarily
dependent on the government for subsistence[;]’” (2) this textual meaning is
“unambiguous[;]” and (3) “as a result, ‘DHS lacks the statutory authority to
reinterpret public-charge admissibility in a way that is contrary to that
definition.’”22
On appeal, the panel majority opinion—authored by Circuit Judge J.
Harvie Wilkinson III—held that the Trump Administration’s promulgated 2018
“public charge” definition was a permissible executive interpretation of the

18

CASA de Maryland, 971 F.3d at 234. The authors find this to be the most helpful and
reflective summary of the changes between prior “public charge” definitions and the proposed
2018 Rule in the public record.
19

Id.
As the panel majority explained in justifying the science and data behind the change of the
definition:
[T]he Rule retains the prevailing test that “[t]he determination of an alien’s
likelihood of becoming a public charge at any time in the future must be based
on the totality of the alien’s circumstances.” 84 Fed. Reg. [] 41,502. Next, the
Rule governs only public charge determinations made in the context of
admissibility; deportations, by contrast, would still be decided under the 1999
Field Guidance and the three-part Matter of B- test. See id. at 41,462. And
lastly, the Rule applies only to public charge inadmissibility determinations
made by DHS, not the other two executive agencies (the Department of State
and the Department of Justice) that are tasked with making public charge
decisions in related contexts. Id. at 41,294 n.3.
CASA de Maryland, Inc, 971 F.3d at 235.
20

21
22

Id.
Id. at 236.
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INA.23 The majority reversed the district court’s granting of a nationwide
preliminary injunction in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Wolf v. Cook
County, Illinois24 and Department of Homeland Security v. Wolf.25
Analyzing the question on the merits, the panel majority framed the issue
as a separation of powers question. The court explained that were it to hold the
definition impermissible, it would serve as a “stark transgression of the
judiciary’s proper role.”26 Enacted in 1882, the court further explained that the
“public charge” rule’s long history supports the finding that “the interpretation
and application of the public charge provision was entrusted to the executive
branch.”27 The court’s detailed historical review attempts to underscore the
actual and apparent authority of the executive branch in making such
determinations about how the phrase “public charge” is to be interpreted under
the INA.
However, the primary issue remains: Is the Trump Administration’s
definition of “public charge” reasonable under the INA? Applying rudimentary
tools of statutory interpretation to resolve this question,28 Judge Wilkinson
directed the court’s analysis toward the plain meaning of “public charge” as the
INA was ratified in 1952,29 an interpretive departure from the district court’s
analysis that starts with the definition of the phrase as customary in 1882.
Relying on Gustafson v. Alloyd Company,30 the panel majority concluded that
the term “‘public charge’ should be given its broad ordinary meaning, as
understood when the INA was enacted in 1952.”31
Accordingly, the panel majority held that “the text, structure, and
statutory context of the INA all confirm that ‘public charge’ should be given its

23
24
25
26

Id. at 229, 250.
140 S. Ct. 681 (2020).
140 S. Ct. 599 (2020).
CASA de Maryland, 971 F.3d at 230.

27

Id. at 231.
For example, when phrases used in a statute are left undefined, the court must “look to the
ordinary meaning of the term . . . at the time Congress enacted the statute.” See Perrin v. United
States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).
28

29

As the CASA de Maryland Court noted,
Congress enacted the INA in 1952. The ordinary meaning of “public charge”
in 1952 was “one who produces a money charge upon, or an expense to, the
public for support and care.” Public Charge, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed.
1951) (defining as used in 1917 Immigration Act); Black’s Law Dictionary (3d
ed. 1933) (same); see also Arthur Cook et al., Immigration Laws of the United
States § 285 (1929) (defining as person who needs “any maintenance, or
financial assistance, rendered from public funds, or funds secured by
taxation”). And “charge,” in this context, meant a “cost” or “expense.” See,
e.g., Charge, The New Century Dictionary (2d ed. 1946); Webster’s New
Century Dictionary of the English Language (1941).
CASA de Maryland, 971 F.3d at 242.
30
31

513 U.S. 561 (1995).
CASA de Maryland, 971 F.3d at 243.
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ordinary meaning; that is, someone who produces a money charge upon the
public for support and care.”32 Moreover, the court delineated that “as the text of
the INA makes clear, the term enjoys, in practice, a certain ambiguity, giving the
executive discretion over the type, amount, and duration of public assistance that
will render someone a ‘public charge.’”33 But expressing a proposed limitation,
the court held that “the term is unambiguous as to the statutory floor it sets for
the executive; a floor that the judiciary is powerless to alter sua sponte.”34 As
such, because congressional reenactment of a glossed term cannot alter or
overcome its plain meaning,35 the Trump Administration’s 2018 interpretation
of the phrase “public charge” wholly comports with the INA’s plain text because
“the text and structure . . . yield a clear answer: the term ‘public charge’ is
naturally read as meaning just that—someone who produces a money charge
upon the public for support or care.”36
III. JUDGE KING’S DISSENT IN CASA DE MARYLAND V. TRUMP
Judge King dissented from the majority opinion, arguing instead that the
DHS Rule must fail at step two under Chevron as an unreasonable interpretation
of the statutory term “public charge.”37 In contrast to the district court, which
found that the Rule failed at both steps under Chevron,38 Judge King stated his
“willing[ness] to assume” that there might be enough ambiguity in the meaning
of “public charge” to proceed to step two.39 However, he would have resolved
step two in favor of the plaintiffs because, “in light of the statutory context and
the history of the term ‘public charge,’ the Rule’s definition is far too broad and
ventures well outside the bounds of any reasonable construction of the term.”40
The dissent acknowledged that the Public Charge statute has never
defined “public charge” explicitly41 and argued that the term is not subject to
unlimited interpretation because it has “consistently described aliens
significantly dependent on the government”42 since Congress first established a

32

Id. at 244.

33

Id.
Id.

34
35
36
37
38

See, e.g., Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991).
CASA de Maryland, 971 F.3d at 245.
Id. at 276 (King, J., dissenting).
See id. at 267.

39

Id.
Id. (agreeing with the Seventh Circuit’s similar conclusion in Cook County v. Wolf, 962 F.3d
208 (7th Cir. 2020), that the Rule’s definition of “public charge” “does violence to the English
language and the statutory context”).
40

41
42

Id. at 268.
Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
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public charge provision in 1882.43 The dissent posited that the term’s
construction under the 1882 statute is further “confirmed by contemporary
dictionary definitions, other statutory provisions, legislative history, and judicial
decisions.”44 Here, Judge King departed from the majority, which began its
review of the statutory history with the 1952 iteration of the INA.45 But the
dissent went further than a discussion of the 1882 public charge provision by
analyzing the text, structure, legislative history, and judicial interpretations of
various public charge provisions to show that the term has been consistently
interpreted for over a century.46
Judge King instead argued that the DHS Rule must be evaluated against
the term’s history.47 In doing so, the Rule “extraordinarily expands the definition
of ‘public charge,’ resulting in a definition of staggering breadth.”48 In sharp
contrast to what he identified as the intended and limited meaning of the term—
an alien likely to become significantly dependent on the government—Judge
King emphasized that the DHS Rule actually defines the term in such a way that
“an alien will be declared likely to become a public charge if he might receive
just a few months’ worth of supplemental benefits at any point in his life.”49
Having identified the “outer limits”50 of the “public charge” definition,
Judge King concluded that “[u]nder any reasonable construction, a person
receiving such a miniscule amount of benefits cannot be said to be significantly
dependent on the government.”51 Because he also found that the Rule “fixes a
boundless definition of ‘public charge,’ it lands far afield of any reasonable
interpretation of the Public Charge Statute,”52 and fails at Chevron step two.

43
See id. at 268 (citing Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214, 214 (1882)); see also
id. at 270 (“Congress—when it first used the term ‘public charge’—did not intend to label as a
‘public charge’ any alien in need of some public aid. . . . Rather, the term ‘public charge’ was
reserved for those unable to care for themselves without significant government assistance.”).
44
Id. at 268 (citing Webster’s 1828 American Dictionary of the English Language, the overall
structure of the 1882 statute, “relevant legislative history,” and judicial decisions from the late
1800s).
45
Id. at 268 n.6 (“By 1952, the term ‘public charge’ had already amassed seventy years’ worth
of meaning.”).
46
47

See id. at 270–75.
Id. at 267–70.

48

Id. at 275.
Id. at 264; see id. at 275–76 (“To be sure, the Rule purportedly retains the totality-of-thecircumstances evaluation that has long applied to public charge determinations, but that evaluation
is now singularly focused on whether an alien is ‘more likely than not at any time in the future to
receive one or more public benefits . . . for more than 12 months in the aggregate within any 36month period.’” (quoting Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,502
(Aug. 14, 2019))).
50
Id. at 278.
49

51
52

Id. at 284.
Id.
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IV. FEDERAL CIRCUITS ARE NOW SHARPLY DIVIDED
As previously noted, the Fourth Circuit’s majority opinion exacerbated
the apparent inter-circuit split between the Fourth Circuit and the Second,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.53 These courts divide on the proper legislative
enactment that controls the Trump Administration’s 2018 promulgation of a new
public charge definition––either the definition of “public charge” incorporated
in the 1882 act, the 1952 act, or the 1996 amendments to the INA. The underlying
differences between these enactments are important because they guide the
Chevron analysis of whether the current rule is a permissible agency
interpretation.
First, in Cook County. v. Wolf,54 the Seventh Circuit held that an
immigrant rights organization, claiming similar organizational injuries to that of
Casa de Maryland, possessed Article III standing to challenge the DHS’s “public
charge” interpretation.55 There, on the merits of whether the agency’s definition
was “arbitrary and capricious,” the court analyzed the issue under Chevron.
Unlike the Fourth Circuit, this court concluded that under Chevron steps one and
two, “the ambiguity in the public-charge provision does not provide DHS
unfettered discretion to redefine ‘public charge’” and “the interpretation
reflected in the Rule falls outside the boundaries set by the statute.”56 The court
thereby concluded that
[t]he Rule has numerous unexplained serious flaws: DHS did
not adequately consider the reliance interests of state and local
governments; did not acknowledge or address the significant,
predictable collateral consequences of the Rule; incorporated
into the term “public charge” an understanding of selfsufficiency that has no basis in the statute it supposedly
interprets; and failed to address critical issues such as the

53
Ann E. Marimow, Court Sides with Trump Administration Effort To Impose ‘Public Charge’
Rule, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2020, 2:41 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legalissues/block-on-trump-administration-public-charge-rule-lifted-by-court/2020/08/05/68f23426d74f-11ea-930e-d88518c57dcc_story.html; Mary Anne Pazanowski, Trump Agency Can Enforce
Public Charge Rule, Fourth Circuit Says, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 5, 2020, 4:09 PM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/trump-agency-can-enforce-publiccharge-rule-fourth-circuit-says (“The decision creates a circuit split. It came one day after the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld an order stopping the rule from taking effect in
New York, Connecticut, and Vermont. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit ordered the agency to stop enforcing the rule in the Chicago area in June.”).
54
962 F.3d 208 (7th Cir. 2020).
55
56

Id. at 219.
Id. at 229.
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relevance of the five-year waiting period for immigrant
eligibility for most federal benefits.57
In San Francisco v. United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services,58 the Ninth Circuit held that because the phrase “public charge” was
ambiguous and the DHS’s final rule was entitled to Chevron deference, a
preliminary injunction was improper because DHS established the required
likelihood that the final rule was not arbitrary and capricious.59 Noting the post1882 act and subsequent legislative history, the court explained that it was
“unable to discern one fixed understanding of ‘public charge’ that has endured
since 1882. If anything has been consistent, it is the idea that a totality-of-thecircumstances test governs public-charge determinations.”60 The court further
found that
the history of the use of “public charge” in federal immigration
law demonstrates that “public charge” does not have a fixed,
unambiguous meaning. Rather, the phrase is subject to multiple
interpretations, it in fact has been interpreted differently, and the
Executive Branch has been afforded the discretion to interpret
it.61
However, in New York v. United States Department of Homeland
Security,62 the Second Circuit held that the DHS’s interpretive rule was
inconsistent with the INA and was arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The
court applied the Chevron deference framework, concluding that the 2018 Rule
is contrary to the INA.63 Reciting an extensive history of immigration laws
surrounding the “public charge” rule, the court held that the phrase historically
has a well-settled meaning: “The absolute bulk of the caselaw, from the Supreme
Court, the circuit courts, and the BIA interprets ‘public charge’ to mean a person
who is unable to support herself, either through work, savings, or family ties.”64
Departing from the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, the Second Circuit
concludes that “Congress ratified the settled meaning of ‘public charge’ in
57
Id. at 233. In a dissent, then–Circuit Judge, now–Supreme Court Justice Amy Coney Barrett
relied on a similar analysis to that of Judge Wilkinson in the Fourth Circuit. Compare id. at 234,
with CASA de Maryland, Inc. v. Trump, 971 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 2020). However, Judge Barrett
primarily disagreed with the panel majority’s assessment that “the plaintiffs’ challenge to DHS’s
definition of ‘public charge’ is likely to succeed at Chevron step two.” Cook Cnty., 962 F.3d at
235.
58
59
60
61

944 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 800–05.
Id. at 796.
Id. at 796–97.

62
Dept. of Homeland Security v. City of New York, 969 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2020), cert.
granted, 592 U.S. ___ (2021) (No. 20-449).
63
64

Id. at 64.
Id. at 71.
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1996.”65 In response to the Seventh Circuit, the court explains that it is “similarly
unpersuaded by the . . . ‘admittedly incomplete’ historical review and its
conclusion that plaintiffs in that case had failed to establish that Congress ratified
the settled meaning of the term.”66 Rather, the court held that “[i]n light of the
judicial, administrative, and legislative treatments of the public charge ground
from 1882 to 1996, . . . Congress ratified the settled meaning of ‘public charge’
when it enacted the [Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act].”67 In sum, the Second Circuit found that DHS had not provided “any factual
basis” for its belief that noncitizens utilizing public benefits would be incapable
to meet their basic needs without federal government assistance.68 While limiting
the scope of the district court’s nationwide injunction to New York, Vermont,
and Connecticut, the Second Circuit dealt a substantial blow to the Trump
Administration’s enforcement of its 2018 interpretation of the phrase “public
charge” in light of Congress’ 1996 ratification of the terms settled meaning.
V. CONCLUSION
The paradox of rules that vulnerable classes of persons face in the United
States is both complex and cumbersome. Various groups of vulnerable persons–
–such as poor immigrants, children, and refugees or asylum seekers fleeing
persecution and violence––face significant challenges and hurdles in gaining
lawful entry into or remaining in the United States. As illustrated by the two
principle Fourth Circuit cases outlined above, the paradox converges on legal
untenability when viewed holistically and in a broader context of empathy for
the vulnerable.
For example, MS-13, now a sprawling international criminal enterprise
that originated in the United States, has been exported from the United States,
and violent gang members are returned to countries such as El Salvador. The
side-effect in El Salvador generates considerable angst and turmoil for refugees
(e.g., Mr. Portillo-Flores) who then seek safe harbor in the United States. MS13’s activities are extensive in El Salvador, and asylum seekers like PortilloFlores face a high bar when BIA immigration judges apply rigorous and
demanding standards in reviewing removal cases for refugees seeking asylum,
notwithstanding Judge Thacker’s dissenting opinion in Portillo-Flores noting
that the proper, required analysis for BIA is more deferential.
In other circumstances, once poor immigrants have entered the United
States, terms like “public charge”––which have been drastically changed by the
Trump Administration––make it significantly easier to deport poor immigrants.
Legal immigrants, who have received public benefits, such as Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF”),
65
66
67
68

Id. at 73.
Id. at 74.
Id.
Id. at 83.
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Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”), Medicaid, and public
housing assistance for more than a total of 12 months within any 36-month
period, can be classified as a “public charge,” thereby becoming ineligible for
permanent residency. Casa de Maryland v. Trump only effectuates the
inconsistent approach that federal courts have taken in responding to DHS’ 2018
promulgation of a new definition of “public charge.” An individual who will
prospectively become a “public charge” is deemed ineligible to become a lawful
permanent resident and faces deportation.
What is the result for vulnerable people like Mr. Portillo-Flores and for
the vulnerable people that organizations like CASA de Maryland serve? In recent
years, and more specifically under the Trump Administration, the U.S.
government has reinterpreted asylum and immigration laws to make it harder for
immigrants, children, and refugees to gain lawful entry into the United States. In
2018, President Trump went so far as announcing an “asylum ban,” which many
legal experts considered to be a violation of well-established international law.
This “catch-22” for refugees and asylum seekers is untenable both as a
matter of law and as a matter of American values. On one hand, gangs originating
in the United States––like MS-13––are “brought to justice” by the U.S.
government and international task forces, and gang members are then exported
to countries like El Salvador. On the other hand, when refugees and asylum
seekers face violence and persecution in their home country because of gangs
like MS-13 and they subsequently seek refuge into the United States, the law
fails to meaningfully protect them from a calamity that originated in the country
they seek protection from.
And when poor immigrants arrive in the United States, as they have for
generations, they face significant barriers to entry. While they work in and
contribute to the U.S. economy, under new federal rules, they can still face
deportation by being declared a “public charge.” Per the Trump Administration’s
2019 rule, the definition of “public charge” has been drastically expanded to
include more vulnerable individuals. Despite immigrants wishing to seek a better
life for themselves and their families in the United States, under the Trump
Administration, poor immigrants are excluded in favor of wealthier, more
prosperous immigrants.
As a sovereign nation, the U.S. government indisputably has the power
to control its laws and maintain, protect, and defend international borders. While
federal courts and judges disagree over operative terms like “public charge” and
the requisite standard for BIA removal proceedings of asylum seekers, the end
burden of this variability in the law still falls flatly on the most vulnerable
persons––immigrants, refugees, children, and asylum seekers—most of whom
are people of color.69 According to recent Pew Center studies, one-quarter of all
69
See generally Abby Budiman, Key Findings About U.S. Immigrants, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug.
20,
2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/08/20/key-findings-about-u-simmigrants/; Phillip Connor & Gustavo López, 5 Facts About the U.S. Rank in Worldwide
Migration, PEW RES. CTR. (May 18, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/05/18/5facts-about-the-u-s-rank-in-worldwide-migration/; Countries of Birth for U.S. Immigrants, 1960-
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U.S. immigrants come from Mexico.70 United States immigrants from the top
five countries of origin—Mexico, China, India, and El Salvador—comprise 44
% of all U.S. Immigrants.71 In 2019, more than half of all refugees entering the
U.S. came from just two countries—The Democratic Republic of the Congo and
Myanmar.72
Now that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari on the public charge
rule issue, we may soon discover how these cases will be resolved. However, the
Supreme Court’s ruling is likely to tell us more about the Justices’s philosophies
on statutory construction and administrative law than give us guidance on how
to resolve these thorny political issues. In the Fourth Circuit, these struggles have
played out internally in response to the Trump Administration’s rigid—and often
inhumane—immigration policies. The court has battled with balancing the
applicable rule of law against the needs of vulnerable persons that these laws
were arguably designed to protect. Moving forward, immigration policies and
asylum laws that are rooted in empathy for the vulnerable would be more
consistent and in line with post–Civil War American ideals, so beautifully
spoken by the Statue of Liberty herself in the famous poem written for her:
“Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free.
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!” 73
Immigration policies reflecting these values—unfortunately too often more
honored in the breach than in the observance—would bring out the best we
Americans have to offer.

Present,
MIGRATION
POL’Y
INST.,
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/datahub/charts/immigrants-countries-birth-over-time?width=1000&height=850&iframe=true
(last
visited Feb. 22, 2021).
70
71
72
73

See Budiman, supra note 69.
See id.
See id.
See Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus (1883).
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